

## **Recommendations**

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### OR COOPERATIVE SECURITY?

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#### **Treaty Regimes and International Law**

- The United States should respect international law and work to strengthen rule-of-law based cooperative security through the development of effective treaty regimes on nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

#### **The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty**

- The United States should make compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligation of pursuing and concluding negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament the central aim of policy on nuclear weapons, recognizing that implementation of a good-faith obligation cannot be indefinitely postponed.
- The United States should work for the achievement of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East as agreed at the 1995 and 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences.
- The United States should promote mandatory adherence to the Additional Protocol as a condition for supply of cooperation, assistance, materials, and equipment related to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
- To improve Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty governance, the United States should support creation of a secretariat and an executive council. The executive council should be empowered to address, on short notice, issues of withdrawal and compliance with non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. Annual meetings of states parties should be similarly empowered.

#### **The Role of the UN Security Council**

- The United States should work with other states to utilize and improve governance mechanisms for the nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons regimes instead of relying on the Security Council as the first resort to deal with issues of non-compliance with non-proliferation and disarmament obligations.
- When a non-compliance matter is before the Security Council, the United States should seek political solutions that address underlying perceptions and conditions of insecurity, and favor innovative

approaches to inducing and enforcing compliance that avoid, when possible, the direct or implied invocation of the possibility of military action.

- To improve the effectiveness of the Security Council in this and other fields, the United States should vigorously support reforms to make it more representative, transparent, and accountable.
- The United States should support multilateral treaty negotiations, not Security Council resolutions, as the optimal means of global law-making.

### **The Breakdown of Disarmament Machinery**

- The United States should work with other countries to achieve agreement on a program of work for the Conference on Disarmament to commence negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and substantive discussions, with the possibility of negotiation, on preventing weaponization of space, nuclear disarmament, and security assurances. The United States should also support the WMD Commission's recommendation to eliminate the consensus requirement for procedural decisions in the Conference on Disarmament.
- The United States should terminate research and development of space weapons, renounce them, and protect U.S. space assets through the negotiation of a treaty banning all weapons in space.
- The United States should support the convening of a World Summit of heads of state on disarmament, non-proliferation, and terrorist use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, or a UN General Assembly Special Summit on Disarmament.

### **Article VI Non-Compliance**

- The United States should implement Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by supporting and working for the commencement of multilateral negotiations on the global elimination of nuclear forces, and working in particular with other states possessing nuclear arsenals to set in motion a process leading to such elimination.
- The United States should fully implement the Article VI obligation of negotiating cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and the commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies. To this end, it should abandon the Reliable Replacement

Warhead program, and refrain from any activities which may lead to the resumed production of nuclear weapons or development of nuclear weapons with improved military capabilities or for new missions.

- The United States should implement the substance of key commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences by taking the following steps:
  - Ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, continue to observe the moratorium on explosive underground nuclear testing pending its entry into force, and work to persuade other countries to ratify the treaty in order to bring it into force.
  - Negotiate with other countries a verified Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty.
  - Negotiate with Russia a new agreement on the deep, verified, and irreversible reduction of nuclear forces, with provisions for the verified dismantlement of warheads withdrawn from deployment under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT). If necessary pending the new agreement, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty should be extended to provide some monitoring of SORT reductions and to continue limits on multiple-warhead, land-based missiles.
  - Remove all U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe to U.S. territory pending their dismantlement, and work with Russia to complete and verify the 1991 process of withdrawal and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia should also negotiate reduction and elimination of all non-strategic nuclear weapons, either separately or together with strategic nuclear weapons.
  - Stand down (de-alert) U.S. and Russian nuclear forces by implementing measures, such as removal of warheads from delivery systems, that lengthen the time needed for launch of nuclear missiles or other use of nuclear weapons.
- The United States should acknowledge that in no circumstance may nuclear weapons be rightly or lawfully used.
- The United States should not enter a nuclear cooperation arrangement with India unless both the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a verified Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty have entered into force and apply to both countries, and India has formally accepted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligation of good-faith negotiation of cessation of arms racing and nuclear disarmament.

## **Preventive War and Counterproliferation**

- The United States should renounce the doctrine of preventive war and the associated counterproliferation doctrine, in particular by rejecting the use of nuclear weapons in preemptive strikes and in response to chemical or biological weapons attacks. The United States should not treat biological and chemical weapons as “weapons of mass destruction” equivalent to nuclear weapons.

## **Nuclear Weapons Research and Development**

- The United States should terminate nuclear weapons research and development, and limit “Stockpile Stewardship” programs to securing the existing arsenal in a safe condition as it awaits verifiable and irreversible disablement and dismantlement, in compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty’s disarmament obligations.
- The United States and other states possessing nuclear arsenals should halt research, development, testing, and component production while reductions of arsenals are in progress, not afterwards, with production and research facilities subject to an intrusive verification regime at the earliest possible time.
- The United States should accompany ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty with commitments to permanently close the Nevada Test Site and warhead component production plants, and to phase out the nuclear weapons laboratories, with specified, measurable milestones.
- Scientists and engineers, and students in those fields, should refuse to participate in the design, development, testing, production, maintenance, targeting, or use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or their means of delivery, or in research or engineering they have reason to believe will be used by others for those purposes.

## **Delivery Systems**

- The United States should abandon the quest to maintain long-term military supremacy through modernization and development of missiles and other strategic delivery systems as well as anti-missile systems and possible deployment of space-based weapon systems. It should instead support the establishment of international controls on delivery systems and anti-missile systems as part of a global process of reducing and eliminating nuclear forces, banning weapons in space, limiting strategic weapons generally, and implementing a policy of “non-offensive defense.”

## **Understanding U.S. Policy**

- The United States should work to develop a pluralist international system managed through norms and regimes and improve and utilize the United Nations and other tools for the prevention of war.

## **Climate Change and Nuclear Power**

- The United States should accelerate and enlarge its support for development of commercially viable renewable and non-carbon emitting sources of energy, and for energy conservation.
- The United States should ratify the Kyoto Protocol and work within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change to further establish norms and regulations on the emission of greenhouse gases.
- The United States should terminate subsidies for new nuclear power plants and phase out nuclear power, and should refrain from promoting nuclear energy as a means to combat climate change.

## **Iran and the Nuclear Fuel-cycle**

- The United States should engage in direct negotiations with Iran and work toward achieving an agreement addressing the spectrum of political, economic, and security issues. Such negotiations should lead to a process resulting in the end of unilateral U.S. economic sanctions, the provision of credible security assurances by the United States, and preclusion of Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons, and culminating in the normalization of relations between the two countries.
- The United States should work multilaterally toward cessation of the construction of additional nationally-controlled plutonium reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities, and support the transfer of existing facilities, including its own, to international control.

## **Toward Nuclear Abolition**

- With Russia and other states possessing nuclear weapons, the United States should implement on an ongoing basis verification and transparency measures that make possible the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

## **The Word as Arrow**

- Civil society should reframe the language used regarding nuclear instruments of mass destruction as follows: refer to their “elimination” or “abolition” instead of using the term “nuclear disarmament,” and redefine the term “nuclear disarmament” to mean “elimination”; eschew use of the term “ultimate” regarding when this elimination will be achieved; and abandon use of the term “deterrence” in describing policies contemplating use of nuclear weapons.

## **A Gender Perspective**

- The United States should pursue security through a cooperative, rule-based international order, with emphasis on the achievement of human security over militarized national security. In doing so, it should evaluate existing security policies and practices to identify and eliminate the influence of misguided associations between masculinity and weapons, and masculinity and the threat or use of force.
- The United States should support the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security.

## **Redefining Security in Human Terms**

- The concept of security should be reframed at every level of society and government, with a premium on universal human and ecological security, a return to multilateralism, and a commitment to cooperative, nonviolent means of conflict resolution.
- The United States should make nuclear disarmament the leading edge of a global trend towards demilitarization and redirection of military expenditures to meet human and environmental needs.
- The funding community should take a longer, broader, and deeper view, and provide sustained support for alternative civil society institutions working for the elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of this new, life-affirming, security paradigm.