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Delivery Systems
Unmanned delivery systems are capable of carrying
payloads vast distances, and of delivering weapons of mass destruction.
Controlling these systems helps control weapons of mass destruction,
because without a delivery system the weapon has no way to reach
its target. The regulation of these delivery systems rests on the
Hague Code of Conduct, export control regimes and Cold War arms
control treaties.
The 2002 International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation, re-named The
Hague Code of Conduct or HCOC, aims “to prevent and curb
proliferation of Ballistic Missiles systems capable of delivering
weapons of mass destruction,” and is to date the most advanced
initiative taken by the international community to address the proliferation
of ballistic missiles.”
This recent initiative calls on all 109 subscribing states “to
exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing
and deployment of Ballistic Missiles capable of delivering weapons
of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national
holdings of such missiles.” Although The Code is not a legally
binding treaty with which members must formally comply, all subscribing
states agree to enact transparency measures on their national ballistic
missile and space launch programs. These measures include the announcement
of launches in advance and the provision annual reports on the amount
and type of ballistic missiles launched each year.
The Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is an informal non-treaty based
(voluntary arrangement) export control regime with the aim of limiting
the spread of missiles and missile technology. Partners have equal
standing in the regime, and all MTCR decisions are taken by consensus.
The MTCR was formed in 1987 by the G-7 (U.S., Canada, the former
West Germany, Italy, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom). As
of March 2001 there are 33 members.
Non-members of the MTCR and the HCOC have tried to address missiles
through the UN. The UN General Assembly has requested the Secretary-General,
to prepare a report on missiles in all its aspects three times with
the assistance of a panel of governmental experts. The Secretary-General
concluded his first report in July of 2002, following three meetings
of the expert panel, but was unable to conclude the second report
because of a lack of consensus in the group. The 2005 resolution
requested the Secretary-General to submit a 2006 report identifying
areas of consensus, to convene a 2007 panel of experts and report
again on missiles in 2008.
During the second half of the Cold War the cornerstone of strategic
stability between the super powers was the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), which the U.S. unilaterally
withdrew from in 2002. This has allowed the U.S. to proceed with
its plans to create a national ballistic missile shield. This program
threatens to erode existing mechanisms for controlling nuclear arms
and may lead to an arms race in space. The 1994
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which contains provisions
on transparency and for the advance notice of ballistic missile
launches, expires in 2009. The U.S. expressed a marked lack of interest
in extending the treaty or pursing similar agreements in the future.
For more information:
Delivery Systems Resources Page
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